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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 
 Whether the Second Circuit correctly held that the 
disclosure of the information required in an annual re-
port on Form 10-K by Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K 
creates a duty to disclose that is actionable under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are scholars at law and business schools in 
the United States and Canada whose research and 
teaching focus on federal securities regulation and the 
governance of public corporations.2 The authors ap-
pearing as counsel on this brief have together submit-
ted to this Court briefs on prior occasions as amici in 
cases arising under the federal securities laws on be-
half of law and business faculty.3 All four authors have 
written about the effect of Section 10(b) on the disclo-
sure requirements adopted by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.4  
 
 1 This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by counsel 
for either party, and no person other than amici and their aca-
demic institutions contributed monetarily to the preparation or 
submission of this brief. None of the schools that employ amici are 
a signatory to this brief, and the views expressed here are not af-
filiated with those institutions. This amicus brief is filed pursuant 
to the blanket consent executed by both parties and filed with this 
Court (by Respondents and Petitioner on June 20, 2017).  
 2 A list of amici is attached as an appendix. 
 3 The authors on this brief have appeared as counsel in 
some or all of the following briefs filed as amicus on behalf of law 
and business faculty. See Brief for Faculty at Law and Business 
Schools as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Merck & Co. v. 
Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2009) (No. 08-905); Brief for Professors at 
Law and Business Schools as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 
(2010) (No. 09-1156); Brief for Professors at Law and Business 
Schools as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Omnicare Inc. 
v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 
et al., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).  
 4 J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DIS-
CLOSURE (4th ed. 2016) (chapters on duty to disclose, materiality, 
MD&A); JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND  
2 
 
 Amici have a common interest in ensuring a 
proper interpretation of the statutory framework put 
in place by Congress. While all participating amici may 
not agree with every statement in the brief, all amici 
agree that Item 303 of Regulation S-K creates a duty 
to disclose for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b). As far as the 
authors of this brief are aware, amici have no financial 
stake in the outcome of this litigation.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 This case addresses a narrow and, until now, 
largely uncontroversial issue; whether the omission of 
information required to be disclosed in a periodic re-
port filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC” or “Commission”) gives rise to a duty to 
disclose under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).5 
 
MATERIALS (8th ed. 2017); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal 
Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures 
to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 749, 754-59 (2007) (describing the application of various dis-
closure rules under the federal securities laws relating to private 
facts about public company executives); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Se-
curities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 607 
(1992). 
 5 We note that a duty to disclose is an element of a fraud 
claim under subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) 
(2017). Subsection (a), however, permits actions for a “device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud” and subsection (c) for “any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person. . . .” § 240.10b-5(a); § 240.10b-5(c). The 
Rule encompasses “conduct.” See Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v.  
3 
 
The court below answered this in the affirmative and 
we agree. The decision is consistent with the plain 
meaning of the rule, the longstanding position of the 
Commission, and the common law and is important to 
maintain adequate compliance with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements embodied in the system of pe-
riodic reporting.  
 This Court’s affirmation of a duty to disclose will 
have little effect on existing practice. Under the cur-
rent state of the law, investors can and do bring fraud 
claims for nondisclosure of required information by 
public companies. Only one circuit has foreclosed these 
claims and only for disclosure required under Rule 
10b-5(b). Even in that circuit, however, investors can 
continue to bring such claims under Section 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). 
Moreover, issuers are aware, and regularly counseled, 
that Item 303 of Regulation S-K (“Item 303”) creates a 
duty to disclose. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. Thus, affirming 
the existence of such a duty to disclose will not signifi-
cantly alter existing practices nor create a new avenue 
for litigants that will lead to “massive liability” or 
 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008) (“Conduct itself 
can be deceptive. . . .”). The deliberate decision to withhold infor-
mation required in a periodic report could constitute conduct ac-
tionable under subsection (a) and (c) even absent the existence 
of a duty to disclose for purposes of subsection (b). See S.E.C. v. 
Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1236, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (Section 17(a)(1) 
or (3) of the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5(a) & (c) applied to persons 
who engaged in “deceptive acts as part of a scheme to generate 
fictitious revenue”); see also Bienewski Ltd. P’ship v. Tising, 63 
F.R.D. 360, 365 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (noting that “even silence or omis-
sion can be a sufficient contribution to a scheme to defraud”).  
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widespread enforcement of “technical reporting viola-
tions.”  
 At the same time, the failure to find a duty to dis-
close in these circumstances will hinder enforcement 
of the system of mandatory reporting applicable to 
public companies and weaken compliance. Inadequate 
compliance can already be seen with respect to the dis-
closure required in management’s discussion and anal-
ysis of financial condition and results of operations 
(“MD&A”) under Item 303, the provision at issue in 
this case. MD&A disclosure remains inadequate. One 
SEC official characterized the level of information as 
“too much elevator music” and not enough “useful 
analysis.” This lament has persisted despite the pres-
ence of private actions by investors and the application 
of substantial effort and deployment of significant re-
sources by the Commission. Any reduction in the exist-
ing level of, or the tools available for, enforcement, 
whether public or private, will make efforts to ensure 
adequate compliance with Item 303 even more diffi-
cult.  
 Reversal of the lower court will reduce incentives 
to comply with the requirements mandated by the sys-
tem of periodic reporting. Enforcement under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) by investors in the case of non-
disclosure will effectively be eliminated. The interpre-
tation will likewise reduce the tools available to the 
Commission to ensure compliance with the system of 
periodic reporting. In an environment of diminished 
enforcement, reporting companies could perceive their 
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disclosure obligations less as a mandate than as a se-
ries of options. Required disclosure would more often 
become a matter of strategy, with issuers weighing the 
obligation to disclose against the likelihood of detec-
tion and the reduced risk of enforcement.  
 Under the approach, investors would not make in-
vestment decisions on the basis of “true and accurate 
corporate reporting. . . .” They would operate under the 
“predictable inference” that reports included the dis-
closure mandated by the rules and regulations of the 
SEC. Particularly where officers certified the accuracy 
and completeness of the information provided in the 
reports, investors would have an explicit basis for the 
assumption. They would therefore believe that omitted 
transactions, uncertainties, and trends otherwise re-
quired to be disclosed had not occurred or did not exist. 
Trust in the integrity of the public disclosure system 
would decline.  
 In this case, investors have alleged that Petitioner 
omitted to disclose a material uncertainty that, at the 
time disclosure decisions were being made, was “known” 
to management and that management understood 
would be “reasonably” expected to have a material 
impact on Petitioner. The record contains officer certi-
fications providing that the annual report on Form 10-
K filed by the Petitioner and at issue in this case, 
among other things, complied with the requirements 
of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. The lower court 
correctly recognized that the mandatory disclosure re-
quirements contained in Item 303 gave rise to a duty 
to disclose and that the omission of material trends 
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and uncertainties could mislead investors. The deci-
sion below should be affirmed.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act assigned to the 
Commission the authority to put in place the system of 
reporting by public companies in order to facilitate 
trading in the secondary markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). 
In constructing an appropriate disclosure regime, in-
vestors were to be given “an intelligent basis for form-
ing [their] judgment as to the value of the securities” 
purchased or sold in the markets. In a system premised 
upon full disclosure, “true and accurate corporate re-
porting” had “vital importance. . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 
1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).  
 Under the existing reporting regime, public com-
panies with a class of securities registered with the 
SEC must file periodic reports, including annual re-
ports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, 
and current reports on Form 8-K. Although each form 
contains a separate set of disclosure obligations, they 
most commonly reference the requirements embodied 
in Regulation S-K, a master set of instructions for pe-
riodic reports, registration statements, and schedules 
required to be filed under the federal securities laws. 
17 C.F.R. § 229.10, et seq. See also Adoption of Inte-
grated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 
18,524, 47 Fed. Reg. 11380, * 1 (Mar. 3, 1982) (Regula-
tion S-K is a “repository for the uniform disclosure 
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requirements of documents filed with the Commis-
sion”). Regulation S-K is a primary touchstone of the 
integrated disclosure system created more than three 
decades ago under the federal securities laws. See Mi-
chael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: 
How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms 
to Make Periodic Public Disclosures, 88 INDIANA L. J. 
151, 178-90 (2013) (summarizing evidence that the SEC 
mandatory disclosure regime is value-enhancing). 
 A critical part of that regulatory architecture, 
MD&A appears in both annual and quarterly reports. 
Under Item 303, MD&A must include a discussion of 
liquidity, capital resources, and results of operations. 
17 C.F.R. § 229.303. In 2002, Congress mandated addi-
tional disclosure in the MD&A, including a discussion 
of off-balance sheet arrangements and certain con- 
tractual obligations. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
§ 401 (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j)). See also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.303(a)(2)(ii) & (a)(4). For the most part, MD&A 
disclosure applies to information deemed material. 
Item 303, however, also requires the disclosure of 
known trends or uncertainties “reasonably likely” to 
have certain effects or that management “reasonably 
expects” to have a material impact on specified items. 
See, e.g., id. at § 229.303(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii) & (a)(4)(i)(D).  
 Providing insight into both historical and future 
financial performance, MD&A has been described as 
the “keystone” to the integrated disclosure system and 
“[o]ne of the most important elements necessary to an 
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understanding of a company’s performance. . . .”6 Com-
mission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discus-
sion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results 
of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 
Fed. Reg. 75055, * 10 (Dec. 29, 2003). 
 
A. The Requirement that Companies Provide 
Disclosure under the Periodic Reporting 
Process Creates a Duty to Disclose Under the 
Antifraud Provisions 
 The antifraud provisions under the federal securi-
ties laws do not impose a general duty to disclose all 
material information. As a result, “issuers retain some 
control over the precise timing of many important cor-
porate disclosures.” Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 72590, * 3 (Dec. 28, 1999). 
 The discretion with regard to the “precise timing” 
of the disclosure of “important corporate” matters 
ceases, however, when issuers have a duty to disclose. 
In those circumstances, silence is no longer permitted. 
As this Court held in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. 
 
 6 Linda C. Quinn, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Statement at The 
Roundtable on the Integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, SEC 
Historical Society, William O. Douglas Open Meeting Room, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., at 
96 (Mar. 21, 2002) (statement by former director, Division of Cor-
poration Finance, SEC); see also Accounting and Investor Protec-
tion Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Before 
the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 107th Congress (2002) (Written testimony of 
Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC) (Mar. 21, 2002).  
9 
 
Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fd., ___ U.S. ___, 135 
S. Ct. 1318, 1331 (2015), such a duty exists where 
disclosure is necessary to avoid “half-truths.” The man-
datory disclosure requirements imposed by the Com-
mission on reporting companies also create a legal 
obligation to speak. These rules and regulations dic-
tate the content of relevant reports and the timing of 
disclosure, eliminating the right to remain silent.  
 The imposition of a “legal obligation” to speak, 
therefore, creates a duty under the “commonly ac-
cepted meaning” of that term. See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also Definition 
of Duty in English, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (defi-
nition of “duty” includes “[a] moral or legal obligation; 
a responsibility”).7 This established understanding of 
the duty to disclose has long been recognized by 
 
 7 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/duty (last vis-
ited Aug. 6, 2017).   
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academics8 and understood by Congress.9 The lan-
guage of Section 11 does not dictate a different result.10  
 
 8 See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., “Federal Corporation Law”: An As-
sessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1157 (1965); see also Wendy 
Gerwick Couture, A Glass-Half-Empty Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 76 MD. L. REV. 360, 397 (2017); G. Mitu Gulati, When 
Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The 
Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 727 (1999); 
Heminway, supra note 4, at 758; Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu 
Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 1639, 1653 (2004); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable 
March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly 
Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 
140-41 (1998).  
 9 Congress, in adopting the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), understood that misrepresentation 
claims could be based upon the omission of required disclosure. In 
the PSLRA, Congress amended Section 12 of the 1933 Act by 
providing an affirmative defense for loss causation. See Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (Section 105 of the Securities Act 
of 1933). The defense applied to actions “described in subsection 
(a)(2)” where liability was premised upon the omission of a mate-
rial fact “required to be stated therein. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b). The 
language suggests that, in adopting Section 12(b), Congress un-
derstood that actions under Section 12(a)(2) could be based upon 
the omission of required disclosure. Given the substantially iden-
tical language in Section 12(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5(b), see infra note 
14, the same awareness by Congress presumably applies to ac-
tions under Rule 10b-5(b).  
 10 Section 11 permits a claim for false and misleading disclo-
sure and for an omission of material fact “required to be stated 
therein. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). The phrase reflected a concern not 
with fraud but with the need for investors to be fully informed 
when making an investment decision. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (setting 
out detailed content requirements for registration statements). 
Omissions of required disclosure did not need to result in fraud. 
Instead, they deprived investors of the information deemed nec-
essary by Congress for an informed investment decision. See E.  
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 Although ordained by the textual language, the 
existence of a duty to disclose in connection with re-
quired disclosure in periodic reports is further com-
pelled by the longstanding position of the Commission. 
The Commission has affirmatively recognized that the 
periodic reporting process gives rise to a duty to dis-
close under the antifraud provisions. The view has 
been expressed in releases. See Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 
65 Fed. Reg. 51715, * 20 n. 86 (Aug. 24, 2000); see also 
Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Commu-
nications, Exchange Act Release No. 40,633, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 67331, * 8 (Dec. 4, 1998) (noting that duty to dis-
close under Rule 10b-5 trigged by “among other things: 
(1) line-item disclosure requirements in filings with 
the Commission”). The position has also been asserted 
in litigation. See S.E.C. v. Conaway, 698 F. Supp. 2d 771, 
834 (E.D. Mich. 2010). See also Brief of the SEC as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, Urging 
 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., Amending the Securities Act. The American Bar 
Association Committee’s Proposal, 45 YALE L. J. 199, 216 (1935). 
Investors deprived of the required disclosure, therefore, did not 
have to show damages from fraud but instead were allowed to 
change their mind and rescind. See William O. Douglas & George 
E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171, 174 
(1933). The right of rescission was, however, eliminated the fol-
lowing year. See Civil Liability for Misstatements in Documents 
Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE 
L. J. 456, 458 (1935). Unlike Section 11, Rule 10b-5(b) is predi-
cated not upon the need for full disclosure but upon the need to 
prevent false and misleading disclosure. The language in Section 
11 concerning facts “required to be stated” therefore has no bear-
ing on the analysis of the language of Rule 10b-5(b).  
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Affirmance, Finnerty v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 756 
F.3d 1310 at 10 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 Likewise, administrative proceedings brought un-
der the antifraud provisions have been explicitly prem-
ised upon the nondisclosure of information required as 
part of the periodic reporting process, including:  
• “related party” transactions under Item 
404, see In re DeGeorge Fin. Corp., Ex-
change Act Release No. 39,319, 1997 WL 
700691, at * 4 (admin. proc. Nov. 12, 
1997); 
• governance requirements in Item 401, see 
In re Ciro Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
34,767, 1994 WL 548994, at * 5 (admin. 
proc. Sept. 30, 1994); and  
• MD&A information mandated by Item 
303. See In re Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 39,472, 1997 WL 784548, at 
* 13 (admin. proc. Dec. 22, 1997); In re Cy-
press Bioscience Inc., Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 37,701, 1996 WL 531656, at * 7 
(admin. proc. Sept. 19, 1996). 
 The existence of a duty to disclose has also been 
confirmed by the Commission’s rulemaking activities. 
On at least two occasions, the Commission has added 
safe harbors to disclosure requirements adopted under 
Section 13(a) explicitly to avoid the creation of a duty 
to disclose under the antifraud provisions. This oc-
curred in connection with disclosure mandated by Reg-
ulation FD, see 17 C.F.R. § 243.102, and disclosures 
triggered by some current reports on Form 8-K. See 17 
13 
 
C.F.R. § 240.13a-11(c). The Commission’s established, 
consistent and longstanding positions, particularly in 
the context of rulemaking, are entitled to substantial 
deference under both Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
 The interpretation of the term “duty” to include a 
legal obligation to disclose information required by a 
specific regulatory directive is also informed by, and 
consistent with, the common law. As a general rule, 
nondisclosure under the common law did not result in 
an action for fraud. See Peek v. Gurney [1873] LR 6 (HL) 
377. Arising out of notions of caveat emptor, the ap-
proach reflected the “traditional ethics of bargaining 
between adversaries, in the absence of any special rea-
son for the application of a different rule.” RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. k (Am. Law Inst. 
1977) (liability for nondisclosure). With caveat emptor 
discarded in the context of the federal securities laws, 
however, the rational has little application with re-
spect to the antifraud provisions. See Santa Fe Indus. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).  
 Even under the common law, however, silence 
was actionable where a duty to disclose existed. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1977) (liability for nondisclosure); see also W. 
PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 738 (Page Keeton ed., 5th ed., 1984). As state 
courts have broadly recognized, such a duty can arise 
where the legal obligation to speak has been imposed 
by regulation or statute. See, e.g., Rodopoulos v. Sam 
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Piki Enters’, Inc., 570 So. 2d 661, 665 (Ala. 1990); 
DiMichele v. Perrella, 120 A.3d 551, 554 (Conn. App. 
2015); Binette v. Dyer Library Ass’n, 688 A.2d 898, 903-
04 (Me. 1996); Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc., 298 
S.E.2d 80, 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Lindner Fund, Inc. 
v. Waldbaum Inc., 624 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 1993); 
Gnagey Gas & Oil Co. v. Pa. Underground Storage 
Tank Fund, 82 A.3d 485, 504 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2014); Fa-
vors v. Matzke, 770 P.2d 686, 690 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
Commentators have also acknowledged that a duty to 
disclose can arise from a regulatory or statutory man-
date. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN AND ELLEN M. 
BUBLICK, DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 682 Nondisclosure (2d 
ed. June 2017 Update); see also Robert M. Washburn, 
Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legisla-
tion, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 393 (1995).  
 The common law likewise makes actionable the 
deliberate concealment of information resulting in a 
“false impression” that “what is disclosed is the whole 
truth. . . .” Stewart v. Wyo. Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 
383, 388 (1888). A “false impression” of this kind can 
prevent further investigation that affects investment 
decisions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 
(Am. Law Inst. 1977) (liability for fraudulent conceal-
ment); see also W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 738 (Page Keeton ed., 5th 
ed., 1984) (“Any words or acts which create a false im-
pression covering up the truth, or which remove an 
opportunity that might otherwise have led to the dis-
covery of a material fact . . . are classed as misrepre-
sentation, no less than a verbal assurance that the fact 
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is not true.”). This “silent fraud” can arise from the fail-
ure to disclose information required by statute. See 
A.D. Transp. Inc. v. Mich. Materials & Aggregates Co., 
Nos. 290236, 290250, at * 4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 
2010); see also Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, 
Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409, 413 (Ill. App. 1987).  
 These common law principles are reflected in this 
Court’s opinion in Omnicare. There, this Court recog-
nized that, under the common law, omitted facts could 
give rise to a duty to disclose where necessary to rebut 
an otherwise “predictable inference.” Moreover, such a 
duty existed where the speaker was understood to 
have “special knowledge” unavailable to the recipient. 
Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1331. 
 Consistent with this reasoning, a periodic report 
could “mislead its audience” by projecting the “predict-
able inference” that the contents of a periodic report 
included the information required by the SEC when in 
fact it did not.11 In those circumstances, investors 
would assume that matters required to be disclosed 
 
 11 The filing of a periodic report is accompanied by an implied 
representation that the contents will conform to the mandatory 
disclosure requirements, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and 
Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 816 n. 157 
(1995), a concept already built into the jurisprudence under the 
antifraud provisions. See Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 
184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the “shingle theory” of liability 
whereby Rule 10b-5 creates an implied duty on the part of a secu-
rities dealer to disclose excessive markups by “hanging out its 
professional shingle”).   
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had not occurred or did not exist.12 As a result, they 
would be operating under a “false impression” with re-
spect to the company’s operations or business and 
would not be making an investment decision on the ba-
sis of “true and accurate corporate reporting. . . .” The 
court below was therefore correct in concluding that 
investors could be misled by the omission of a material 
adverse uncertainty required to be disclosed under 
Item 303.  
   
 
 12 As we discuss elsewhere in this brief, the view by investors 
may not be merely “inferred” but rather based upon affirmative 
statements of compliance with legal requirements. The chief ex-
ecutive officer and chief financial officer must certify the accuracy 
of the annual report on Form 10-K and the quarterly reports on 
Form 10-Q. The officers must represent that they are unaware 
of any “untrue statement of material fact” or material omissions 
and that the financial statements and information “fairly present 
in all material respects the financial condition, results of opera-
tions and cash flows” of the company. Rule 13a-14(a), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13a-14(a). See also Regulation S-K Item 601(b)(31), 17 
C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31) (setting out the language required for the 
certification). The requirement that reports “fairly present” a 
company’s financial condition applies to MD&A disclosure. See 
Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual 
Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 46,427, 67 Fed. Reg. 57275, 
* 6 (Aug. 28, 2002). In addition, officers must certify that the Re-
port “complies with the requirements of Section 13(a). . . .” 18 
U.S.C. § 1350; see also Rule 13a-14(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b). 
Based upon both sets of representations, reasonable investors 
would believe that the periodic reports contained all mandatory 
disclosures.  
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B. The Reaffirmation of a Duty to Disclose with 
Respect to Required Disclosure Will Not Re-
sult in “Massive Liability” or Efforts to En-
force Technical Violations of the Periodic 
Reporting Requirements  
 The reaffirmation of a duty to disclose in these cir-
cumstances will not, as Petitioner asserts, create a 
threat of “massive liability” or transform investors into 
the enforcers of “thousands of technical reporting re-
quirements.” Brief of Petitioner, at 16-17. These asser-
tions are based upon the assumption that this Court is 
being asked to create a duty that has previously not 
existed. That is simply not the case.  
 Until the 9th Circuit’s decision in In re NVIDIA 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014), no cir-
cuit court had unequivocally ruled out the existence of 
a duty to disclose arising out of mandatory disclosure 
requirements in an action arising under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5(b).13 Circuit courts either found a duty 
 
 13 Petitioner has identified only two appellate courts that 
have “rejected” the determination that Item 303 creates a duty to 
disclose. See Brief of Petitioner at 19 (citing NVIDIA and see Oran 
v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000)). We agree, however, with 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation that Oran did not find an ab-
sence of a duty to disclose for required disclosure. See Stratte-
McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2015). We 
note that in the aftermath of the decision in Oran, investors con-
tinued to file claims under Item 303, with courts resolving the 
claims on grounds other than the absence of a duty to disclose. See 
In re Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1536223, 
* 19 n. 7 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2017); Messner v. USA Technologies, Inc., 
2016 WL 1466543, * 4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2016); In re Campbell 
Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 591 (D.N.J. 2001).  
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to disclose, assumed a duty to disclose, or declined to 
address the issue. Likewise, courts routinely agreed or 
assumed that Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act 
permitted claims for nondisclosure of required infor-
mation.14  
 Investors have, therefore, generally been free to 
assert claims alleging the failure to comply with the 
mandatory disclosure requirements under the federal 
securities law and issuers have been counseled accord-
ingly. See William R. Rohrlich II, Disclosure Implica-
tions of Recent Developments in SEC Compliance, in 
SEC COMPLIANCE BEST PRACTICES, 2015 ED.: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING NEW REGULATIONS AND 
DEVELOPING COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES (INSIDE THE 
MINDS), 2015 WL 5565388, at * 4 (2015) (“Until the cir-
cuit split is resolved by the Supreme Court, if at all, 
registrants should assume that failure to meet the dis-
closure requirements under Item 303 could subject 
them to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims for secu-
rities fraud.”). See also THOMAS J. DOUGHERTY, THE DI-
RECTOR’S HANDBOOK, Appendix B (2017) (“A company 
has a duty to disclose . . . when a law or regulation re-
quires it (annual and quarterly reports, registration or 
in the event of selective disclosure)”). Moreover, despite 
the existing latitude to bring these claims, the number 
of actions filed by investors has apparently been quite 
 
 14 This is the case even though Section 12(a)(2) contains lan-
guage very similar to Rule 10b-5(b). See Stratte-McClure v. Mor-
gan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Like Section 
12(a)(2), Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of ‘material fact[s] neces-
sary in order to make . . . statements made . . . not misleading.’ ”).  
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modest and has certainly not resulted in “massive lia-
bility” or generated widespread efforts to enforce “tech-
nical reporting requirements.”15  
 The explanation for this result is straightforward. 
The existence of a duty to disclose arising from the 
omission of required information under the system of 
periodic reporting neither obviates the need to allege 
the other elements of fraud nor mitigates the obliga-
tion to meet the elevated pleading standards applica-
ble to these actions, including the requirement in 
investor litigation of a “strong inference” of scienter.16 
The claims pose a particularly serious challenge to in-
vestors to establish that the nondisclosures resulted in 
causal loss. Moreover, as a practical matter, even when 
these and other substantive requirements can be met, 
 
 15 We base this statement on our collective experience. We 
note, however, that a search of reported district court opinions in 
the 9th Circuit, one of the most common locations for securities 
fraud cases (see Stefan Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent 
Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2016 Full-Year Re-
view, NERA 11 (Jan. 2017) (“Filings continued to be concentrated 
in the Second and Ninth Circuits, where more cases were filed 
than in all other circuits combined”)), revealed less than 40 
unique cases brought by investors between 1988 and 2017 that 
cited Item 303, a modest number at best. 
 16 See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp, L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 723 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (in addition to duty to disclose, the need to establish 
materiality provides “sufficient protection against the opening-of-
the-flood-gates argument advanced by [defendant] and accepted 
by the District Court.”).  
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investors are unlikely to bring actions for nondisclo-
sure where the damages are insufficient to permit a 
meaningful recovery.17  
 The difficulty in bringing fraud claims in the case 
of nondisclosure is more than surmise. Cases are 
commonly dismissed in high percentages. See Stefan 
Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Secu-
rities Class Action Litigation: 2016 Full-Year Review, 
NERA 25 (Jan. 2017) (“Between 2008 and 2011, the 
most recent years with a substantial resolution rate, 
about half of the cases filed were dismissed.”). Allega-
tions relating to the omission of disclosure required by 
Item 303 have been dismissed for failing to sufficiently 
allege materiality, failing to allege scienter, or failing 
to allege knowledge of a trend or uncertainty. More- 
over, costs to issuers are minimized during the pen-
dency of a motion to dismiss as a result of a stay of 
discovery. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. 
 Accordingly, a reaffirmation by this Court of a 
duty to disclose arising from mandatory requirements 
under federal securities law will, at most, modestly im-
pact enforcement by investors. An explicit endorse-
ment of that duty to disclose by this Court will provide 
 
 17 Investors will need to incur the damages necessary to ad-
dress the costs associated with maintaining such an action. Ad-
mittedly an extreme case, lead counsel in the Enron case absorbed 
approximately $45 million in expenses and 280,000 hours of time 
case prior to settlement and approval of the fee request. See 
Newby v. Enron Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 774 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 
(noting that lead counsel advanced “over $45 million in expenses 
and 280,000 hours of time”).  
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some additional clarity in circuits that have not 
squarely addressed the issue. In those circuits, how-
ever, investors have already been able to bring claims 
premised upon the failure to disclose information re-
quired in periodic reports. A meaningful increase in 
these actions is therefore unlikely.  
 Affirming the existence of a duty to disclose will 
alter the law in the 9th Circuit. Such actions, however, 
have only been foreclosed since 2014. Moreover, the de-
cision in NVIDIA applied only to claims under Rule 
10b-5(b) and did not prevent actions for disclosure un-
der Sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.  
 Indeed, even in that Circuit, claims could be main-
tained in some circumstances for nondisclosure of re-
quired information in periodic reports. Under Section 
11, nondisclosure of trends, uncertainties, and other 
required information in periodic reports – the very is-
sue in this case – would be actionable to the extent 
such reports were incorporated by reference into a reg-
istration statement, a not uncommon phenomena for 
public companies. See In re Caine, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 55,476 (admin. proc. March 15, 2007) (finding 
that “Form S-3 incorporated prior filings by reference 
and thus repeated the false and misleading statements 
from those periodic reports. In addition, the Form S-3 
did not disclose the material and adverse trends and 
uncertainties that were known to management at the 
time concerning the commuters.”). Given that, it is im-
plausible that positive law or public policy dictates a 
different result when the cause of action is premised 
directly on the same disclosure lapse. 
22 
 
C. Eliminating Fraud Actions for Nondisclosure 
of Information Required by Item 303 and 
other Provisions of Regulation S-K Will Im-
pair the Quality of the System of Periodic Re-
porting  
 While reaffirmation of a duty to disclose will not 
result in “massive liability” or widespread enforcement 
of “technical violations,” the failure to do so will sub-
stantially weaken enforcement of the periodic report-
ing regime applicable to public companies. A holding 
that repudiates the existence of a duty to disclose in 
this context will at best provide additional incentives 
for nondisclosure and at worst provide protection for 
the deliberate concealment of material information. 
The increased incentives favoring nondisclosure will 
have the capacity to create a “regulatory lottery,” with 
issuers more willing to make decisions about disclo-
sure on the basis of the risk of detection and the re-
duced likelihood of enforcement.  
 
1. Existing Levels of Enforcement Have Not 
Resulted in Adequate Levels of Compli-
ance with Item 303 of Regulation S-K  
 The failure to affirm a duty to disclose will harm 
the system of required disclosure for public companies 
by reducing deterrence for noncompliance, a particular 
concern with respect to nondisclosure.18 Nondisclosure 
 
 18 See Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litiga-
tion, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 116 n. 99 (2004) (“[T]he history of the 
SEC and federal securities law, perhaps above all else, has taught 
that no mandatory disclosure system, no regulatory requirement  
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can raise difficult issues of detection.19 The periodic re-
porting requirements compel disclosure of many facts 
that would otherwise remain unknown to investors. 
Absent compliance with the mandatory disclosure rules, 
investors are unlikely to ever learn about related party 
transactions subject to Item 404, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404, 
compensation matters mandated by Item 402, 17 
C.F.R. § 229.402, or undisclosed trends and uncertain-
ties required by Item 303. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. Such 
matters can be material to investors and affect invest-
ment decisions. 
 A review of the MD&A disclosure produced over 
the last four decades illustrates the risks that will ac-
company any reduction in enforcement authority. Item 
303 has resulted in inadequate disclosure. Although 
describing the purpose of the MD&A as “not compli-
cated,” see Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, supra, 
* 2, the Commission has deployed an extraordinary 
mix of resources designed to ensure compliance. These 
have included: 
 
or prohibition, no SEC review ultimately will effectively work un-
less the relevant statute or rule is consistently enforced. Periodi-
cally the SEC has received an inadequate budget and been 
understaffed. Private enforcement, warts and all, endures as a 
pivotal means to ensure law compliance.”). 
 19 With respect to affirmative statements, investors are in a 
position to investigate the accuracy of the representations. They 
can, for example, seek additional information from the company 
through the use of inspection rights under state law. See Delaware 
General Corporation Law § 220. In the case of nondisclosure, how-
ever, investors would often remain entirely unaware of the matter. 
Further investigation would not, therefore, be possible.  
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• the systematic review of SEC filings, see 
Business and Financial Disclosure Re-
quired by Regulation S-K, Exchange Act 
Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23915, 
* 49 (April 22, 2016); 
• the publication of “cautionary advice,” see 
Accounting Policies; Cautionary Advice 
Regarding Disclosure, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 45,149, 66 Fed. Reg. 65013 (Dec. 
17, 2001);  
• the monitoring of earnings calls, see 
Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks 
Before WESFACCA: Let the Story Shine 
Through (Mar. 5, 2010);  
• the issuance of multiple releases provid-
ing detailed guidance on appropriate dis-
closure, see Management’s Discussion 
and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 18,120, 23 SEC Docket 962 
(Sept. 28, 1981) (release not published in 
Federal Register), Management’s Discus-
sion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations; Certain In-
vestment Company Disclosures, Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 22427 (May 18, 1989); Exchange Act 
Release No. 48,960, supra; and 
• the filing of enforcement proceedings, in-
cluding those premised upon violations 
of the antifraud provisions. See In re 
Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
39,472, 1997 WL 784548 (admin. proc. 
Dec. 22, 1997). 
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 Despite the prodigious efforts, adequate compli-
ance has remained elusive. In the early years of the 
MD&A, a chair of the Commission described the dis-
closure as an embarrassment. See Harold M. Williams, 
Chairman, SEC, Address at the Financial Executives 
Institute: Current Problems in Financial Reporting 
and Internal Controls 9 (Oct. 9, 1979). Officials at the 
SEC have expressed “great concerns” with MD&A dis-
closure compliance, Linda C. Quinn, Dir., Div. of Corp. 
Fin., Statement at The Roundtable on the Integration 
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, SEC Historical Society, Wil-
liam O. Douglas Open Meeting Room, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., at 97 
(Mar. 21, 2002), and described the contents of MD&A 
as “quite troubling. . . .” Remarks by SEC Commis-
sioner Walter, supra.20  
 The Commission has characterized MD&A in “too 
many companies” as “difficult to understand and con-
fusing. . . .” see Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, su-
pra, * 5, and, as recently as 2016, found the disclosure 
as “less detailed” than desired and in need of “greater 
analysis” and “additional explanations. . . .” See Ex-
change Act Release No. 77,599, supra, * 49. One direc-
tor of the Division of Corporation Finance, the Division 
 
 20 Concerns over the quality and content of MD&A have been 
echoed by public commentators, see Letter from Dennis M. Kelle-
her, President & CEO, et al., Healthy Markets, Inc., to Brent J. 
Fields, Sec’y, SEC, at 14 (July 21, 2016) (noting that “the lack of 
analysis in the MD&A is a matter of real concern.”), and academ-
ics. See Stephen V. Brown & Jennifer Wu Tucker, Large-Sample 
Evidence on Firms’ Year-over-Year MD&A Modifications, 49 J. 
ACCT. RES. 309, 312 (2011).   
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within the SEC responsible for the oversight and inter-
pretation of Item 303, characterized the content as 
having “too much elevator music” and not enough “use-
ful analysis.” Alan L. Beller, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., 
SEC, Integration Roundtable, supra, at 126.21  
 Targeted attempts to improve disclosure have not 
always worked. Efforts to increase discussions of im-
portant issues such as cybersecurity in the MD&A, see 
DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: 
TOPIC NO. 2 (Oct. 13, 2011), have apparently failed. See 
Tatyana Shumsky, Corporate Judgment Call: When to 
Disclose You’ve Been Hacked, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 
2016 5:31 PM). In addition, as some have asserted, 
MD&A disclosure requirements did not function suffi-
ciently to provide adequate warning of the capital and 
liquidity problems that surfaced in the financial crisis 
of 2008. See Letter from Kurt N. Schacht, CFA, Man-
aging Director, Standards and Advoc., CFA Inst., and 
James C. Allen, CFA, Head, Cap. Mkts. Pol. – Americas, 
CFA Inst., to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC, at 5 (Oct. 6, 
2016).22  
 
 21 The omissions may not always be a matter of mistaken 
judgment. One commissioner (and later Chair) at the SEC even 
suggested that omissions were potentially deliberate, with some 
companies possibly “wait[ing] to make disclosures” until prodded 
by the Commission. Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Be-
fore WESFACCA: Let the Story Shine Through (Mar. 5, 2010).  
 22 Nor were these concerns entirely unnoticed. The staff of 
the Division of Corporation Finance issued letters in 2008 raising 
concerns with MD&A disclosure on matters that could affect li-
quidity and capital resources. See Sample Letter from the Senior 
Assistant Chief Accountant, Division of Corporation Finance,  
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 Despite the SEC’s repeated laments about poor 
compliance, there have been few investor or govern-
ment enforcement actions premised on a failure to 
comply with Item 303. See supra note 15; see also Peti-
tioner’s Brief, at 43 (noting that Commission has 
“brought fewer than 100 actions alleging noncompli-
ance with Item 303” in the decades since the adoption 
of Regulation S-K). This likely reflects the formidable 
burdens faced by investors and the SEC in establish-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, violations of 
Item 303. The determination that a duty to disclose 
does not exist for the failure to comply with Item 
303 would additionally reduce the tools available for 
ensuring compliance. Given the already challenging 
environment, particularly with respect to MD&A, a re-
duction in enforcement will further compromise these 
efforts.  
 
2. The Failure to Find a Duty to Disclose Will 
Significantly Reduce Enforcement of the 
Periodic Reporting Requirements and the 
Deterrence of Noncompliance 
 Absent a duty to disclose, private enforcement un-
der Rule 10b-5(b) for fraudulent nondisclosure of infor-
mation required in periodic reports will effectively be 
 
Sent to Public Companies on MD&A Disclosure Regarding the 
Application of SFAS 157 (Fair Value Measurements), Sept. 16, 
2008; Sample Letter from the Senior Assistant Chief Accountant, 
Division of Corporation Finance, Sent to Public Companies on 
MD&A Disclosure Regarding the Application of SFAS 157 (Fair 
Value Measurements), March 27, 2008.   
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eliminated.23 Even where investors subsequently learn 
about the concealment of material information, re-
course may well be left to the Commission. The Com-
mission’s decision to initiate an investigation and 
bring an enforcement proceeding will depend upon ad-
ministrative constraints and uncertainties and will 
not be guaranteed.24  
 At the same time, the reversal of the lower court’s 
decision in this case will directly affect the Commis-
sion’s enforcement capabilities. As with investors, the 
SEC must allege a duty to disclose to maintain an 
 
 23 But see supra note 5. The Exchange Act includes a private 
right of action in Section 18 for “false and misleading” statements 
in documents filed with the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78r. Section 
18, however, does not expressly sanction actions based on decep-
tive or fraudulent omissions to state material facts. Moreover, a 
cause of action brought under Section 18 is largely unavailable to 
investors, at least those seeking class action status. See Howard 
v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (Sec-
tion 18 requires evidence of “actual reliance” and, as a result, “is 
not a sufficient replacement for suits under § 10(b). . . .”). To the 
extent that a court were to find that successful Section 18 actions 
based on nondisclosure require the existence of a duty to disclose, 
the reversal of the lower court in this case would eliminate a cause 
of action of that kind under Section 18.  
 24 See supra note 18. Nor will the Commission necessarily ob-
tain sufficient recovery to compensate investors. The Commission 
generally seeks disgorgement and penalties while investors seek 
damages. The two amounts are not the same. See Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 311 (Feb. 2014) (noting that 
“class action plaintiffs can assert large damage claims, far in ex-
cess of the measure that would be available under a disgorgement 
rule”). Moreover, amounts obtained as disgorgement may not be 
paid to “victims” but instead “dispersed” to the U.S. Treasury. See 
Kokesh v. S.E.C., ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).   
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action under Rule 10b-5(b). The SEC, therefore, will no 
longer be able to bring claims under Rule 10b-5(b) 
based upon the nondisclosure of information mandated 
in Regulation S-K.25 Notwithstanding the fact that its 
own rules require disclosure, the Commission will be 
forced to look elsewhere to find a duty to disclose.  
 The loss of Rule 10b-5(b) as an enforcement and 
deterrence tool will be significant. The provision has 
significant capacity to deter. Fraud claims under the 
provision can include an officer and director bar, see 
Section 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2), a particularly 
“feared” remedy. See Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, 
Speech at the Securities Enforcement Forum 2012: 
Taking a No-Nonsense Approach to Enforcing the Fed-
eral Securities Laws (Oct. 18, 2012). Individuals can be 
liable as primary violators.26 Actions for fraud also can 
 
 25 The absence of a duty to disclose may impact the SEC’s 
enforcement authority under other provisions of the federal secu-
rities laws. Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act use 
similar language. See Walck v. Am. Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 789 
n. 16 (3d Cir. 1982) (“Section 17(a) is substantively identical to 
Rule 10b-5”). Moreover, such a determination could narrow en-
forcement by state regulators. Section 501 of the Uniform Securi-
ties Act of 2002 includes a prohibition on securities fraud. The 
provision is “modeled on Rule 10b-5 adopted under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933.” REVISED UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 501 (Official Com-
ment). Given the overlap in language, state courts often defer to 
and rely on federal interpretations. See Adam J. Gana & Michael 
Villacres, Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry . . . Ex-
cept for New York: New York’s Martin Act and the Private Right of 
Action, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 587, 591 (2014). 
 26 An individual can be a primary violator of Rule 10b-5(b) 
to the extent qualifying as a “maker” of the false statement. See 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135,  
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render unavailable safe harbors for the private place-
ment of shares and forward-looking information. See 
21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1)(v). 
These effects create the potential for severe reputa-
tional consequences, see Christopher F. Baum, James 
G. Bohn, & Atreya Chakraborty, Securities Fraud and 
Corporate Board Turnover: New Evidence from Law-
suit Outcomes, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 14, 16 (2016) 
(discussing literature indicating that filing of fraud ac-
tions can have a “negative impact on CEO careers”), 
and substantial harm to the business of an issuer. See 
Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 
2016).  
 The elimination of actions under Rule 10b-5(b) 
based on noncompliance with mandatory disclosure 
obligations will also affect the settlement of actions for 
nondisclosure brought under other provisions. Most ac-
tions brought by the SEC settle. See Note, Ross Mac-
Donald, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New 
SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 421 
(2012) (“The Commission currently settles, in a man-
ner not unlike the scenario described above, roughly 
98% of its cases.”). Even when fraud is not ultimately 
charged, the mere possibility of a claim under Rule 
10b-5(b) has the potential to result in settlements that 
include more severe penalties or consequences, provid-
ing additional deterrence. Eliminating the possibility 
 
142 (2011) (noting that “maker” was the “person or entity with 
ultimate authority over the statement”). At least one circuit, how-
ever, has held that individuals may not be charged as primary vi-
olators under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. See S.E.C. v. 
Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016).  
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of a claim for fraud under Rule 10b-5(b) as a result of 
nondisclosure of required information in periodic re-
ports will reduce Commission leverage in negotiating 
these settlements.  
 The absence of claims under Rule 10b-5(b) could, 
therefore, affect the Commission’s ability to deter vio-
lations of the periodic reporting requirements. With 
limited resources, the Commission cannot conduct 
every possible investigation or bring every viable case. 
Enforcement must instead reflect agency priorities. 
Deterrence of wrongdoing represents a key priority. 
See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the IOSCO 
39th Annual Conference: The Challenge of Coverage, 
Accountability and Deterrence in Global Enforcement 
(Oct. 1, 2014). Any reduction in the deterrent effect of 
SEC enforcement as a result of the loss of claims under 
Rule 10b-5(b) for the omission of required disclosures 
in periodic reports may well result in even fewer actions 
by the Commission to enforce these requirements.27  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
 27 With respect to Item 303, the result would be a reduction 
in the already modest number of actions. See Petitioner’s Brief, at 
43. Regulation FD provides an example of the consequences of an 
enforcement regime lacking in private enforcement and largely 
limited to actions by the Commission under Section 13(a). Be-
cause of a safe harbor included in the Regulation, actions for non-
disclosure under Rule 10b-5(b) are generally unavailable. See 17 
C.F.R. § 243.102. Mostly limited to actions under Section 13(a), 
the filing of enforcement actions have occurred “so infrequently” 
and involved penalties of “such a low magnitude that the regula-
tion is unlikely to deter opportunistic selective disclosure in prac-
tice.” Martin Bengtzen, Private Investor Meetings in Public Firms: 
The Case for Increasing Transparency, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 33, 38 (2017).  
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CONCLUSION 
 The determination that a duty to disclose exists 
for purposes of actions based upon nondisclosure un-
der Rule 10b-5(b) entails a straightforward application 
of the plain meaning of the nature and language of the 
mandatory disclosure rules that regulate the content 
of a public company’s required reports. Quite simply, a 
disclosure mandate in law or agency rules creates a 
duty to disclose. Commentators and the Commission 
have long recognized this basic point. Disclosure re-
quired in periodic reports creates a legal obligation to 
speak, obviating an issuer’s ability to remain silent. 
The reaffirmation by this Court of a duty to disclose in 
these circumstances will be consistent with existing 
practices.  
 On the other hand, the elimination of a duty to dis-
close will adversely affect the remedies available to in-
vestors and curtail enforcement tools possessed by the 
Commission, harming the system of mandatory disclo-
sure. The holding will result in arbitrary distinctions 
among investors. Nondisclosure will be actionable if 
arising in connection with an offering under Sections 
11 or 12(a)(2) but not if occurring in connection with 
transactions in the secondary markets under Rule 10b-
5(b). This will be the case despite the fact that inves-
tors acquiring shares in an offering may have a claim 
for nondisclosure of required information in a periodic 
report (to the extent incorporated by reference into a 
1933 Act registration statement) while other investors 
– including those purchasing or selling their shares in 
the public trading markets – will not have a cause of 
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action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) for the 
very same nondisclosure in the very same report.  
 In a regulatory regime built around “true and ac-
curate corporate reporting,” there is little doubt that 
the omission of required information can mislead. In-
vestors will operate under the “predictable” inference 
that periodic reports contain the information required 
by the rules and regulations of the Commission. Par-
ticularly where officers certify the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the information provided in the reports, 
investors will have an explicit basis for the assump-
tion. The omission of a required transaction, uncer-
tainty, or trend, will create an inference that no such 
matter had occurred or existed. The absence of re-
course by investors in these circumstances would re-
duce trust in the integrity of the system of disclosure 
and ultimately harm the securities markets.  
 In this case, investors alleged the omission of a 
material uncertainty required to be disclosed by Item 
303. The MD&A in the annual report on Form 10-K 
filed by Petitioner in March 2011 included a section in 
the MD&A titled “Business Environments and Trends” 
(see JA 901) that noted the existence of “a number of 
additional risks and uncertainties which could impact 
our U.S. Government business. . . .” JA 903. In another 
section of the MD&A titled “Commitment and Contin-
gencies” a reference was made to the existence of “a 
number of reviews, investigations, claims, lawsuits and 
other uncertainties related to our business. . . .” See JA 
928.  
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 In neither of these sections did the report include 
a discussion of facts relating to the CityTime matter, 
the uncertainty alleged to have been omitted. In addi-
tion, officers certified the accuracy of the Report, see 
JA 1115 (certification of CEO under § 302 of Sarbanes-
Oxley); JA 1118 (certification of CFO under § 302 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley), including a representation of con-
formity with the requirements mandated by Section 
13(a). See JA 1122 (certification of CFO under § 906 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley); JA 1122 (certification of CFO un-
der § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley).  
 The Petitioner’s alleged failure to comply with its 
regulatory obligation to disclose breaches a duty to dis-
close for purposes Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b). Al-
legations of that failure should be permitted to proceed 
to adjudication. 
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 For these reasons, amici respectfully urge this Hon-
orable Court to affirm the ruling of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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